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an additional amount specified for each country in Appendix Z, while the other Article 3.4 activities cropland management, grazing land management and revegetation can be accounted for without any restrictions. 3 Although LULUCF projects in the CDM are limited to forestry projects only, we use the term LULUCF when refering to the CDM forestry activities.
final decisions on these implementation issues are supposed to be taken on COP 9 in December 2003. The definitions of forest, afforestation and deforestation adopted for Art. 3 are probably going to be applied to the CDM as well. But it remains unclear if additional decisions are going to be taken to explicitly exclude certain project types, like monocultural plantations or agroforestry projects. If the Kyoto definitions, which rely solely on three quantitative thresholds (minimum land area, minimum crown cover and minimum height of trees), will not be modified, all project types, including plantations and agroforestry projects will be eligible CDM projects.
Decisions to be taken on these issues will determine the potential of LULUCF in the CDM and therefore, the role LULUCF might play in the first commitment period of the climate regime. In this paper, we use a quantitative approach to estimate effects of different policy decisions concerning LULUCF in the CDM on the carbon market, the creation of CDM emissions permits as well as on the distribution of economic benefits between countries.
LULUCF in economic models
Most of the economic models of the international carbon market are mainly based on the marginal abatement cost curves of the energy sector and do not include the sink enhancement activities allowed in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Some account for LULUCF activities in a very simple manner by modifying the marginal energy cost curve through the inclusion of one horizontal segment with a constant marginal cost for the amount of carbon sequestration assumed to be available (e.g. (Missfeldt and Haites 2001; Michaelowa 2002), Jotzo, 2002) . Others assume zero cost sinks for Annex B by shifting the energy cost curve to the right by the sequestration potential (Kappel, Staub et al. 2002) . This negligence of LULUCF in economic models leads to an unsatisfactory representation of the reductions potentials and costs countries encounter in the climate regime.
But what means including LULUCF into a model? What the sinks potentials and costs and, therefore, the carbon sequestration cost curves -look like is mainly determined by policy decisions taken in the frame of the international climate regime, e.g. which sinks enhancement projects are eligible, how the GHG reduction is accounted for and how costly the emissions permits generated through forestry projects will be. Almost all of the models including sinks do not specify at all which LULUCF activities they considered for the calculation the sinks potentials and costs or only focus on one forestry activity, e.g. afforestation.
In this paper, we analyse the implications of different policy decisions in the climate negotiations concerning LULUCF in the CDM 4 on the supply of tradable emissions permits by differentiating four sink enhancement project types. This makes it possible to carry out a scenario analysis, varying the assumptions on policy decisions like project eligibility in the framework of the CDM and carbon accounting. Therefore, marginal carbon sequestration cost curves 5 for Non-Annex-B regions will be developed and implemented into the carbon market model CERT.
Carbon sequestration costs in the literature
The research on carbon sequestration is relatively young. Starting in the late 80s, mainly US- Missfeldt and Haites (2001) . 5 The term carbon sequestration cost curve is misleading when refering to conservation of forest or avoiding/slowing deforestation, since these lead to emission reductions. However, it will use here for all marginal cost curves of forestry projects. 6 For a detailed analysis of past studies see Richards and Stokes 2003 7 Of course, there is also the option of constructing marginal sequestration cost curves by a top-town approach. In our study we are just looking at bottom-up cost curves, since the development of top down costs curves for LULUCF is still in its infancy.
not allow for a comprehensive analysis on the main factors which influence the differences in costs.
8 Most of the studies neglect a substantial part of costs (e.g. land costs, monitorig costs) as well as the benefits 9 generated by the projects (Kauppi, Sedjo et al. 2001 ). This, of course, will change the cost estimates dramatically and result in a distorted structure of estimates when comparing different project types. Fast growing plantations, e.g. may have higher implementation costs than avoided deforestation projects, but they also generate marketable benefits which can make them even profitable. Other factors influencing the carbon sequestration cost will be the discount rate used for the costs as well as the carbon benefits, the carbon accounting method applied, the model used to estimate the opportunity cost of land, the baseline assumed, the physical characteristic of the project area, the biomass pools included, the silvicultural species used etc..
Due to the inconsistencies in the use of different geographic scopes, terms, underlying assumptions and methods, the existing studies on carbon sequestration costs are not comparable (Kauppi, Sedjo et al. 2001; Richards and Stokes 2002) . This makes it impossible to take marginal forestry sequestration cost curves for the implementation into a global carbon market model from the existing literature. Therefore, for this study, we relied on a simple method to develop consistent marginal carbon sequestration cost curves, which can be implemented into a global carbon market model.
Development of marginal carbon sequestration cost curves
The purpose of this paper is to analyse in detail possible policy scenarios concerning forestry in the CDM. Therefore, it is necessary to define what activities we consider to be eligible sink 9 Here we are referring only to the direct, marketable benefits. Necessary data for the development of our cost curves is data on land availability potentials for each project type in hectares per year, carbon uptake factors in tCO2/ha and year and costs for possible forestry activities in $/tCO2. 11 By multiplying the land availability and carbon uptake factors one receives the carbon sequestration and storage potential for each project type and country. 12 However, the use of the word "potential" in the literature on carbon sequestration is often unclear and misleading. Cannel (2003) distinguishes between three different interpretations of the term potential, first the "theoretical potential capacity"
(physical potential without consideration of practical, e.g. institutional or financial constraints), second the "realistic potential capacity" (physical potential with consideration of most constraints, but optimistic assumptions) and finally the "conservative, achievable capacity" (cautious prognosis, based on current trends, with few optimistic assumptions).
We base our land availability potentials on the data from Trexler and Haugen (1995) , who added qualitative constraints 13 to their physical potential estimates in 52 tropical countries 14 to achieve more realistic land availability potentials for the above four project types. For our 10 Regeneration under the Kyoto Protocol falls under the term "Reforestation", which for the first commitement period will be equal to "Afforestation", since it is limited to reforestation occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989. Some Parties are pushing for a change the deforestation base year for the use of the definition in the CDM, though. 11 Although we are often using the term carbon, the measurement unit used is always carbon dioxide (CO2). This makes sense, because in the frame of the IPCC, carbon dioxide (CO2) was chosen as the reference gas to for the Global Warming Potentials. However, many studies and models and especially the literature in the US employ carbon (C) as the main measurment unit. 12 For obtaining potentials for the first commitment period, the annual values are multiplied by five. 13 Variables considered are: existing land use and projected land-use change, population growth rates and urbanization trends, institutional and economic sources of deforestation, governmental and non-governmental forestry experience and infrastructures, current foresry-concession, agricultural and energy policies, land-tenure systems and land-titling requirements, political and economic structures and stability, infrastructural development plans and potential environmental, economic or social crisis facing the country. 14 These 52 countries, plus China and Chile, which we included additionally, cover the most important countries for forestry projects under the CDM. 2001). In our study, the amount of carbon from LULUCF projects on the market does not represent the real carbon uptake, but the one accounted for by the carbon accounting scheme used for forestry projects in the CDM. Due to the given uncertainties on this carbon accounting scheme 16 , we considered two different sets of carbon uptake factors, one with low and one with high estimates, representing a conservative and a less conservative carbon accounting respectively. For plantations the carbon uptake factors vary between 5.5 and 22
tCO2/ha and year, for agroforestry between 1.8 and 4.2 tCO2/ha and for regeneration between 1.8 and 14.7 tCO2/ha, without considering belowground biomass and carbon storage in wood products. 17 The carbon emissions saved through avoided deforestation were calculated on the basis of data from Trexler and Haugen (1995) This is supposed to account for revegetation occurring in the baseline after forest clearing, which reduces the amount of carbon credits that can be generated by the project. On the basis of the described land availability estimates and carbon uptake factors, we calculate the 15 The most probable base year for deforestation is 1989, as stated in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. But, as mentioned earlier, the base year for deforestation might still change, since some countries are trying to push through a later base year in the negotiations. 16 The carbon accounting schemes under discussion vary by the length of project lifetimes, crediting period as well as the way they consider impermanence of carbon sequestration. 17 The exclusion of soil carbon can be justified by the uncertainties in soil carbon measurement as well as the high costs that will prevent most of the project developers from including soil carbon uptake in their carbon potential carbon sequestration and storage for the different project types as summarised in As explained above, the cost estimates vary widely and are not comparable neither between activities nor between countries. Therefore, based on the literature review, we assume a certain order of net cost estimates with plantations being the cheapest of the regrowth project types. In this order of costs, agroforestry follows as the second cheapest project type. High implementation costs of these two projects are often assumed to be almost compensated by income generated through marketable benefits. Consequently, regeneration projects involve higher net costs, since less marketable benefits accrue and regrowth is slower.
The literature is divided over the costs of avoided deforestation. While many studies find it to be the most cost-efficient sinks project type (e.g. Newell and Stavins 2000) others studies argue that costs are higher than in other project types because opportunity costs of alternative use of the forested land have to be taken into account (e.g. Sathaye et al. 2001) . For this study, two cost scenarios are constructed, one with avoided deforestation being the cheapest and the other one with it being the most expensive of the four project types.
Cost differences of regrowth projects between countries are calculated considering differences in GDP/capita and the carbon uptake factors 18 , while costs for avoided deforestation are assumed to be determined by scarcity of arable land and the carbon uptake factors of the project activity in the respective country. 19 Our cost estimates range rather in the lower bound of the ones given in the literature, but do not include negative costs which are often found in bottom-up studies. The latter can be justified by the recent decision of the CDM Executive
Board on the additionality of projects, which suggests that no-regret projects are unlikely to But with the withdrawal of the US, even when assuming some partial participation in the carbon market, the biggest buyer of emissions permits leaves the market, which will dramatically reduce the demand for emissions permits. On a perfect market and with zero participation of the US, this would drive the price of emissions permits to zero. For the hot air suppliers Russia and the eastern european countries this would mean a loss of the revenue from the sale of their surplus emissions permits. Therefore, it is probable that the hot air supplying countries will exert market power to maximize their revenue from permit sales 19 Cost ($/tCO2) = D * 1/(0.07*C*L) , with D = default value (0.14 for cheap and 6 for expensive avoided deforestation scenario), C= carbon uptake factor for respective project type, L = ha of arable land per capita in 1999. 20 In equilibrium models, anyways, no negative costs (no-regrets) exist by assumption. Bottom-up cost curves, often including negative costs, would then have to be scaled up, so the cost curve starts at the interception of the x and y axis. 21 The first two scenarios (1A-2D) include avoided deforestation as an eligible project activity, thus representing only a hypothetical policy development, since avoided deforestation has already been excluded from the CDM. In spite of this, we decided to include it in our analysis. 25 In the negotiation process, some were pointing out the multiple benefits of avoiding deforestation in the first place instead of having to incur time and effort for afforestion or reforestion, and others brought up the argument the inclusion of avoided deforestation would lead to a flooding of the carbon market and thus the crowding out of emissions reduction projects in the energy sector. By including avoided deforestation, we are able to examine if the latter concern is justified or not. Furthermore, this argument is based on the claim that avoided deforestation is relatively cheap as compared to any other sinks and non-sinks projects. To account for the mentioned uncertainties concerning the real costs for avoided deforestation, the respective scenarios look at two cases, one with avoided deforestation being the cheapest and one with it being the most expensive project type.
Additionally, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the conservativeness of the carbon accounting scheme by applying one high and one low set of carbon uptake factors. When considering the existing 1% cap on the use of rCERs, we assumed the maximum amount of available rCERs to be equal to the maximum allowed amount (479.1 million tCO2 or 95.8 million tCO2 per year) of the 1% cap. 26 This is only applicable to scenarios, where the carbon sequestration/storage potential is greater than the one defined by the 1 % cap, which is only valid for the scenarios including avoided deforestation.
The policy scenarios 3 to 5 encompass the regrowth policy options still under discussion. In the following, we are therefore referring to these scenarios as the "realistic policy scenarios".
They all exclude avoided deforestation and vary the eligibility of the three regrowth project types as well as the carbon uptake factors applied in the development of the cost curve.
Scenarios 3A and 3B represent a policy decision on project eligibility based only on the quantitative definition of forest, afforestation and reforestation as used under Article 3, without the explicit exclusion of certain regrowth project types. The other two scenarios additionally exclude agroforestry projects (scenario 4) or plantations (scenario 5).
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In the realistic policy options (scenarios 3 to 5), the potential of rCERs will not exceed 300.4
MtCO2 (scenario 3A), which represents 18.6 % of the total reduction requirements. 28 If policy should decide to exlude agroforestry practices from the CDM, the maximum amount of rCERs will be between 91.4 and 283.6 MtCO2, 5.7 % to 17.5 % of the total reduction requirements, respectively. Should plantations be excluded (5A and 5B) a maximum of 66.9-155 MtCO2 CERs (4.1 % to 9.6 % of total reduction requirements) could be offered on the market. In the scenarios including avoided deforestation, the potential to create rCERs could reach 1996.3 to 3605.5 million tCO2 (123.5 % to 223 % of reduction requirements). At these levels, the 1% cap gets binding, which would limit the amount of rCERs bought on the market during the first commitment period to 479.1 million tCO2, representing almost 30 % of total reduction requirements.
The market price of emissions permits under our standard scenario "No Sinks" which does not include LULUCF in the CDM is 3.08 US$/tCO2. In the realistic policy scenarios 3A and 3B, the effect of including forestry sinks in the CDM will lead to a slighly reduced price of 2.51-2.92 $/tCO2 -depending on the carbon uptake factors considered -as compared to 3.08$/tCO2 in the standard scenario. When additionally excluding certain project types, as e.g. agroforestry in the 4A and 4B, the carbon price reaches 2.54 to 2.89 $/tCO2, and thus does not differ very much from scenario 3. The scenario with the exclusion of plantations, leads to a negligible reduction in the permit price of 0.05 to 0.38 $/tCO2 as compared to the "No Sinks" scenario. Therefore, we can conclude, that in any of the cases which are still open policy options (scenarios 3 to 5), the effect of the inclusion of forestry sinks in the CDM on the carbon price will be rather small, at least for the first commitment period. The withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol and the amount of hot air offered on the market remain the main factors which determine the market price, while the role of rCERs will be of minor importance
The price reduction of the most optimistic avoided deforestation scenario 2A leads to a permit price of 0.95 $/tCO2. When assuming avoided deforestation to be the most expensive of the four forest project types and considering the 1% cap (scenarios 1C and D) , the effect on the market price will be in the range of the ones without deforestation (price 2.73 -2.86 $/tCO2).
In the case of avoided deforestation as the cheapest activity and including the 1% cap (scenarios 2C and D), the price will be decreased to 0.98 -1.09 $/tCO2. This suggests, that the inclusion of avoided deforestation has a potential to exert a significant effects on the carbon price if the assumption holds, that it will very cheap. Although this effect is considerable compared to the realistic scenarios 3 to 5, it is a relatively small effect as compared to the ones exerted by the US withdrawal and the hot air in the market. In the probable case of avoided deforestation being more expensive than widely thought, its inclusion would not have a significant effect on the carbon price, especially when considering the 1% cap (scenarios 2C and 2D).
In spite of this, one of the main concerns for the exclusion of avoided deforestation, namely its potential to crowd out the energy projects if it had been included as an eligible option in the Kyoto Protocol is confirmed by our analysis. As shown in Table 5 , in the scenarios 1A and B as well as 2 A and B, all the reduction requirements not fulfilled by hot air or domestic abatement, can be fulfilled only by sinks CERs, thus crowding out the non-sinks projects.
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While hot air covers around 30 % of reduction requirements, between 46.6 % and 60.9 % could have been fulfilled by rCERs if avoided deforestation would have been included and no cap on sinks credits would apply. Due to the cheap supply of hot air, the amount of the potential rCERs supply is considerably higher than the actually demanded ones in these scenarios, though (compare column 2 and 3 of Table 5 ). However, the 1% cap considered in the C and D scenarios reduces the amount of reduction requirements fulfilled by rCERs to around 30 % (479.1 MtCO2), thus leaving some space for non-sink CDM projects. In the realistic policy scenarios, the percentage of reduction requirements covered by rCERs is considerably lower and reaches values between 4.1 % and 18.6 %. In these scenarios, Annex B countries meet their reduction requirements to at least 28.3 % with non-sink CERs and abate around one forth domestically. Therefore, in the realistic scenarios rCERs play some, but no dominant role in the carbon market of the first commitment period. Non-sinks projects and domestic abatement will still have a considerably higher share in the fulfillment of reduction requirements. When worrying about the environmental credibility of the climate regime, hot air is certainly the bigger issue. It has to be emphasised though, that this is only true because of the policy restrictions put opon LULUCF in the CDM. When looking at the policy unrestricted LULUCF scenarios including avoided deforestation (scenarios 1A, 1B and 2A, 2B) the role of LULUCF could outweight the one of hot air by far.
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Distributional aspects
The CDM is supposed to provide the opportunity for Non-Annex B countries to participate in the first commitment period of the climate regime by attracting sustainble climate projects.
For the Annex B countries, the CDM broadens the chances to reduce emissions where they are cheapest and offers the opportunity to decrease compliance costs. Therefore, policy decisions on forestry sinks always have implications for the distribution of costs and benefits between different countries. As shown in Table 6 , Annex B countries incur a total of 2353 million $ to fulfill their Kyoto obligations in the scenario without forestry in the CDM, with Eastern Europe and FSU making a profit from hot air sales of 417 million $ and 2136 million $, respectively.
For Non-Annex B countries, the CDM without forestry projects gives the opportunity to gain 708.6 million $, with China getting the biggest (506.5 million $) and Brazil the smallest slice (4.9 million $) of the cake.
In general, the more and the cheaper forestry offsets are offered on the market, the more FSU and Eastern Europe lose their benefits from hot air trading. In spite of this, Annex B as a whole is gaining from the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM, because the overall compliance costs decrease. With 62 %, the maximum potential reduction in compliance cost is reached in scenario 2A. In the scenarios considering the 1 % cap, the decrease in compliance cost reaches a maximum of 8.8 % in the case of expensive avoided deforestation (scenario 1C) and 61.4 % in the case of cheap avoided deforestation (scenario 2C). Thus, in the case of cheap avoided deforestation, the reduction in compliance cost for Annex B Parties will be considerable, even when considering the 1 % cap.
For the realistic policy scenarios, the reduction in total compliance costs due to the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM range between 1.3 % in scenario 5B and 14.2 % in scenario 1A. The exclusion of avoided deforestation limits the redistribution of benefits from Non-Annex B towards Annex B and thus maintains some of Non-Annex B profits from the standard scenario. All Non-annex B countries except China export a greater or at least the same amount of CERs in all the scenarios. 31 Although the amount of CERs exported from Non-Annex B rises, the Non-Annex B Parties still lose as a whole compared to the standard scenario because this quantity effect is overcompensated by the price effect induced by the shrinking permit price. However, this loss is smaller the more expensive or the more restricted the sinks options are, meaning, the the more expensive or the less sinks CERs can be created.
Again compared to the case of a purely energy based CDM, all forestry sinks scenarios results in a redistribtion of CDM potentials from all other Non-Annex B countries towards Latin America and Africa, the two regions mainly represented in the ROW group. This is due to the 31 Except in two cases (scenario 1B and 2D), in which also India´s exports are reduced. For the export of permits see Appendix E.
relatively low non-sink CDM and the high forestry CDM potential of most Latin American and African countries. In the realistic policy scnearios, additionally India is joining the group which is profiting from an introduction of LULUCF in the CDM, especially in the cases where plantations are not excluded project activities. In spite of China´s big LULUCF potential, it encounters the biggest loss of all countries due to this redistribution. The explanation for this is, that its huge CDM potential from substitution of coal based electricity generation has still greater dimensions than its forestry potential.
This redistribution pattern, can explain most of the country positions in the climate negotiations concerning the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM. It might be the reason for the division of Non-Annex B countries represented in the G77/China group over the question whether to include LULUCF in the CDM at all, with most of the Latin American countries having been in favour and most of the Asian countries having been against them (Anderson, Grant et al. 2001) . Africa was in favor of LULUCF in the CDM, because its potential to participate in a purely energy based CDM is relatively small. Especially China, but also India have been the greatest opponents of the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM. While the position of China derives from the big losses from any kind of introduction of LULULCF in the CDM, the situation of India is more complex. In our analysis, India loses in the most of the scenarios including avoided deforestation, but gains in most of the realistic policy scenarios. 32 Russia was opposing LULUCF in the CDM, but at the same time, it managed to negotiate a maximum amount of LULUCF for Appendix Z under Art. 3.4 in the climate negotiations (Michaelowa, Greiner et al. 2001) . This, at first view, contradicting position is explicable, because on the one hand, Russia has a considerable domestic LULUCF potential which can be used to further increase amount of Russian hot air. On the other hand, Russia encounters a devaluation of its hot air through the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM.
Astonishing, from an economic point of view, is that Brazil has been rejecting avoided deforestation in the CDM. In all our scenarios with avoided deforestation, Brazil profits like no other country from its introduction into the CDM. This position and the active role Brazil took in the negotiations to prevent avoided deforestation from being included may be explained by non-economic reasons, like the strong position of Brazil in the G77 group as well as sovereignty concerns about the amount of foreign investment in the Amazon region (Fearnside 2001; Michaelowa, Greiner et al. 2001) . 32 The contrary can be found in scenario 1C and 5A. Also for EEX and DAE, the direction of the results is not the same for all scenarios, which can be explained by the interaction of the market price, costs and rCERs potential of the respective country.
Uncertainties and limits of the analysis
The basis of our analysis is the construction of the LULUCF supply curves, which are subject to uncertainties about the potentials and costs they are based on. Especially the costs estimates are contributing to this uncertainty because they are often neglecting certain elements influencing the costs of forestry projects, like land costs, monitoring costs or marketable benefits. Furthermore, the techniques employed for the estimation of carbon sequestration costs mostly do not consider transaction costs which have to be incurred before and during the project activities. However, transaction cost can make up a relatively big share of project costs ranging from search cost for finding appropriate project land, costs for negotiating contracts up to investments in programs and institutions giving incentives to farmers to plant trees on non-forested lands. (Kooten van, Shaikh et al. 2002 ). An additional optimistic element to our already low cost estimates is that the consideration of transaction costs in the model probably does not cover the full amount of transaction costs related to LULUCF projects. Therefore, our cost estimates will result in rather optimistic cost curves. Protocol. Therefore, the countries actually demanding rCERs will be limited to Japan, Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands and Canada (Bernoux, Eschenbrenner et al. 2002) .
Consequently, due to political preferences the demand for rCERs might be smaller than assumed by the model, which additionally decreases the role LULUCF in the CDM might play in the first commitment period. On the other hand, the total demand for emissions permits in the CERT model might be underestimated, because it is assumed that Annex B countries will use all of the emissions permits they own or buy to fulfill their obligations in 33 Another important aspect to address under our assumptions of very low costs is, that transaction costs will make up the biggest part of costs and will in some cases be almost as high as the permit price. Therefore, transaction costs become a really important subject, because they could get the decisive factor for which projects will be implemented in which countries. Though, little is known on transaction costs of CDM projects still. 34 The Netherlands, Austria and Denmark 35 This position might change though, if the EU should run into problems fulfilling its reduction requirement with domestic action or non-sinks emissions permits.
the first commitment period. The CERT model is a static partial equilibrium model considering the first commitment period only and is not able to account for banking of emissions permits. From our analysis above we know, that the permit price in the first commitment period will probably be very low. One strategy Annex B countries might follow is the banking of (bankable) emissions permit while using a greater amount of sinks CERs for complying with their first commitment period target, since all other emissions permits are bankable 36 , while rCERs are not. This way, they could take advantage of the relatively cheap emissions reductions in the first commitment period and carry some of them over to the second commitment period. Such behavior might lead to some increase in permits demand.
However, this will not change our results concerning the importance of sinks CERS on the market substantially, since the potential of the eligible forestry projects (scenario 3 to 5) is the limiting factor for the forestry projects in the CDM.
Conclusion
The rules and modalities for the implementation of LULUCF projects in the CDM are one of the last open issues of the Kyoto Protocol, on which final decisions are supposed to be taken at COP 9 in December 2003. We analyse the implications of different policy decisions concerning this subject on the supply of tradable emissions permits, the carbon market price and the distribution of costs and benefits between countries and regions.
The literature on forestry carbon sequestration does not offer a guideline on costs and potentials of forestry projects, since the range of estimates is huge and no factors influencing the costs of projects can be clearly identified. Furthermore, studies on carbon sequestration cost curves are not comparable due to different methods, terms and assumptions used.
Therefore, we construct our own marginal cost curves for Non-Annex B Parties, representing the forestry carbon sequestration and storage options in the CDM. Contrary to most of the other studies on carbon sequestration cost curves, we differentiate four different forestry project types which makes it possible analyse policy decisions on LULUCF project eligibility in the CDM. For the scenario analysis, we implement our LULUCF cost curves into the carbon market model CERT.
The compliance cost of Annex B countries decline, the broader the eligibility of projects for the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM is defined. Avoided deforestation, which has already been excluded as an eligible project type, has the greatest potential to lower the market price (from 3.08 $/tCO2 to maximum 0.95 $/tCO2) and thus, the compliance costs of Annex B Parties (at most 62 % cost reduction). If one considers the 1% cap on the use of 36 With the exeption of RMUs, which are the LULUCF credits created in the frame of Joint Implementation.
rCERs, then this price reduction turns out to be smaller. In general, the effects of an inclusion of avoided deforestation in the CDM on the market price are relatively small when comparing them to the implications of hot air or of the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol.
When looking at the LULUCF policy options which are still under discussion for the CDM, our results suggest a rather small reduction of the permit price between 0.05 and 0.57 $/tCO2, which is almost negligible. In the most optimistic of our realistic forestry scenarios, 18.6 % of the permit demand will be covered by forestry CERs. With around 30 % of the reduction requirements being covered by hot air, this leaves a space of around 28.3 % to non-sinks CDM projects and 22.9 % to domestic abatement. In the most restrictive sink scenario 5B, the percentage of reduction requirement being met by forestry CERs is considerably lower and reaches only 4.1 %. This leaves a space of around 39 % of the reduction requirements to be covered by non-sinks projects. Based on these results, LULUCF in the CDM will play some, but no dominant role. When pointing to problems concerning the environmental credibility of the Kyoto Protocol, not LULUCF in the CDM but hot air is certainly the bigger issue.
However, the latter is only true because the use of LULUCF in the CDM is limited by policy.
For the hypothetical policy unrestricted cases, energy projects in the CDM are crowded out by LULUCF projects and the amount of rCERs traded on the market is considerably higher than the one of hot air. Our results suggest that the role CDM forestry sinks in the first commitment period might play will to be rather limited. This is reinforced by the consideration of uncertainties in the cost estimates used for the construction of the marginal cost curves. Several aspects lead to the conclusion, that our cost curves are rather optimistic upper bound estimates of the forestry CDM potential and, thus lead to an overestimation of the already suggested small role of forestry CERs.
This rather small role of LULUCF in the first commitment period does not say anything about the role LULUCF might play after the year 2012. However, the LULUCF potentials, especially for avoided deforestation, suggest that they might turn into an important element in the negotiation of reduction targets of future commitment periods. Furthermore, the practical experience, the progress in reducing uncertainties in carbon measurement and the credibility of forestry projects implemented in the first commitment period will be decisive for decisions to be taken on the inclusion of LULUCF beyond 2012. ,613,333 2,612,500 551,306,250 953,906,250 730,631 1,680,448 15,244,167 32,110,833 568,894,381 990,310 
